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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S'I'ATE OF UTAH, by and Through t 
Its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
.JACK C. JENSEN and MEREA W. 
.JENSEN, his Wife, and INTER-
:HOUNTAIN HOLDING 
CU~fPANY, 
Defenda1nts-Appellarn.ts. \ 
Case 
No.11387 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is one in condemnation brought by the 
Highway Commission for highway purposes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'rhe case was tried the first time by Tom Plattis, at-
tornc~" for the State of Utah. At the conclusion of trial, 
t!H· Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson granted the state a 
110w trial. The case was retried before the Honorable 
Lc•o11arcl W. Elton with George E. Bridwell, Special 
\:-:sistant Attorney General representing the state in the 
1 
second trial. Appellants appeal from Judge Jeppson 'R 
order granting a new trial and from the judgment of the 
verdict rendered as a result of the second trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent contends that the rulings of the court 
below are correct and should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees that the statement of facts con-
tained in appellants' brief is substantially correct. The 
following additional facts are presented for clarification. 
On August 9, 1955, the Utah State Road Commission 
entered into a contract with American Smelting and Re-
fining Company for the purchase of 4.94 acres of land 
for highway purposes. American Smelting and Refining 
Company agreed to convey 4.94 acres of land and all of 
their rights of egress to or from their remaining land ex-
cept one twenty-foot opening. The State Road Commis-
sion of Utah agreed to pay $4000 for the 4.94 acres and 
to construct an approach to the twenty-foot opening. 
(R-36.) 
There is no need to second guess the reasons why 
the approach road was not constructed since all that mat-
ters was the fact that the State of Utah, by and through 
its Road Commission, paid appellants $6750, plus inter-
est for respondent's failure to construct an approach 
road. (R-208, 93.) 
On September 13, 1967, the first trial commenced on 
one issue, namely: the value of the difference in appel-
lant's land with one twenty-foot opening and without 
the twenty-foot opening. (R-50.) 
After judgment on the jury verdict, respondent 
m(wed for a new trial. The lower court denied the mo-
tion on condition that appellants remit the sum of $4,250 
from the verdict of $16,250, leaving a net judgment of 
$12,001.00. (R-124, 125.) 
After the order was signed and entered, one of the 
attorneys for appellants who was not present at the time 
set for argument had a further order signed by the trial 
jrn1ge ex parte on November 29, 1967. (R-126, 127.) Re-
spondents then moved for an order granting a new trial 
anc1 to vacate the order signed by the trial judge on No-
vember 29, 1967. (R-128, 129.) After hearing the matter 
the trial court vacated the order and granted a new trial. 
(R-130.) 
Thereafter a new trial was commenced on June 3, 
1968, George E. Bridwell, special assistant attorney gen-
eral, then representing the state. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT MAY GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL ON GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE DAM-
AGES EVEN THOUGH JURY VERDICT IS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Appellant's Point I presupposes that a trial court 
('a1mot grant a motion for a new trial on grounds that 
the verdict is excessive and not justified by the evidence 
when the verdict is within the limits of the testimony. 
Such is not the law nor can support for such contention 
be found. On the contrary, in Wellman v. N able, 12 Utah 
2d 350, 366 P .2d 701 ( 1961), this court rejected the argu-
ment proposed by appellant at 703: 
"The mere fact that the jury verdict is supported 
hy substantial evidence sufficient to make a pri/)/a 
facie case and furnish a reasonable basis for their 
decision does not require that the trial court's or-
der granting a new trial should be reversed. Thi~ 
is especially true where the order for the new trial 
is based on the amount of the verdict.'' 
Again in King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 
P.2d 692 (1949), the Court stated at 698: 
''The defendant's contention that a trial judge in 
most cases should not grant a new trial when th~ 
verdict is supported by substantial competent 
evidence cannot find support in the authorities." 
One good reason for the rule is shown to exist in the 
case at bar, where it is clearly demonstrated how the jury 
arrived at its verdict of $16,250. 
It ·was stipulated and the jury ·was so instructed, 
that the \'alue of the land area taken was $1.00 (R. 94), 
and the right of appellants to have an approach road 
built was settled for $6750. (R. 93.) It was also stipu-
lated that the construction of the approach road would 
cost $23,000. ( R. 411.) Throughout the trial the fignrcR of 
$6750 and $23,000 were before the jury. At one point the 
lo\ver court instructed the jury that the $6750 \nlS to he 
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,·ow.;iclerecl by them as a partial payment. (R. 378.) It 
took little imagination to show that the jury subtracted 
$G7:-JO from $23,000 in arriving at their verdict of $16,250. 
'rhere can be no doubt but that the lower court took 
thcsr facts into consideration when it granted respond-
~nts' motion for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In points I and II of appellants' brief seeking to re-
1·iew the trial court's order granting a new trial, this 
ronrt is limited to one determination, which is: Was such 
au order an abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Chris-
lrnsen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552 (1962); Paul v. Kirk-
endrdl, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Duffy v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080 (1950). 
Respondent's motion for a new trial contained seven 
points of error, all of which were argued by respondent 
at the time set for hearing (R. 119-120). The trial court 
;;rant eel the motion on the ground "that the verdict of 
$16,250 is excessive and not justified for want of sufficient 
1·\·illence and appears to be given under the influence of 
p11ssion and prejudice" (R. 124-125, 130) while respond-
rnt believes that the single ground used by the trial court 
is sufficient, this court can sustained the order granting 
a new trial on any ground which was presented. Worth-
i 1111f o u v. Caldwell, 65 ·wash. 2d 269, 396 P.2d 797 (1964); 
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5 AM. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error §850 (1962). See also 
Stack v. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594 (1950) 
wherein this court had to assume the ground the lower 
court relied on. 
Motions for new trial are addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the court, and the judgment of the lower cort 
should only be reversed where there has been plain abuse 
of discretion, Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Wester11 
Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2cl 240 (1955); Burto11 
v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 
P.2d 514 (1952); Marshall v .Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., 118 
Utah 161, 221 P.2d 868 (1950), but whether granted or , 
denied, the discretion of the trial court will be presumed 
to have been properly exercised unless abuse is clearly 
shown. Moser v. Zion's Co-op Jiil ercantile Institution, 
114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948); Lehi Irr. Co. v. M.oyle. 
4 Utah 327, 9 Pac. 867 (1886). Nothing in the record or 
in appellants' brief indicates that there was any abuse of 
discretion whatever. 
In order to put this appeal in its proper perspective, 
it is necessary to point out that this is not a case \Yhcre 
the trial cort denied a motion for n new trial but rather 
where the trial court, having seen and heard the witness 
and presided over the jury, granted a new trial. BecauRe 
of this fact a stronger showing of abuse of discretion will 
ordinarily be required to set aside an order granting ti 
new trial than to srt aside a11 order denying a new trinl. 
Hrortlii11gto11 v. Cald11·ell, supra. 
(j 
Further, this court has laid down the rule that it 
will be slow to interfere with a ruling of lower court 
granting or denying a new trial on questions pertaining 
to damages, Page v. Utah Home Fire Lns. Co., 15 Utah 
2do 257 (1964) ; Paul v. Kirkendall, supra, (1953); Mitch-
rll v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 117 Utah 224, 214 P.2d 
020 (1950); Moser v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Institution, 
supra 1949; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 
(1940); Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 
191 (1940). This is so because the trial judge who saw 
and beard the witness and observed the reaction of the 
jury is much better able to determine the question of 
t•xccssiveness or prejudice, State v. Christensen, supra 
(1962), and this court should not substitute its discretion 
for that of the trial court. Moser v. Zion's Co-op Mer-
rantile Institution, supra ( 1948). 
It is respondent's contention that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in granting a new trial 
tn that there was substantial conflict of evidence on the 
only issue in the case. Nor is there need that the evi-
deuce be uncontroverted in favor of the moving party. 
In King v Union Pac. R. Co., supra (1949) this court 
stated at 698: 
"We cannot agree with the trial judge that 
the evidence is 'uncontroverted' in the two re-
spects mentioned by him in his decision. How-
ever, as has been pointed out, it is not necessary 
that the evidence be uncontroverted in favor of 
the moving party before the trial court can grant 
a new trial. The evidence in the instant case as 
to the two particulars mentioned by the trial 
judge is conflicting and there does appear in the 
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record substantial competent evidence whid1 
would support a verdict for the plaintiff. Noth-
ing more need appear. The defendant docs not 
contend that the jury could not have reasonahly 
found for the plaintiff.'' 
It has been held by this court that all that nce<ls to 
appear in the record is competent evidence which would 
support a verdict in favor of the party moving for a new 
trial. In reaffirming the King case this court in Stack "· 
Kearnes, supra (1950) stated at 243: 
''Assuming that the trial court grantc(1 the 
new trial on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the verdict, as contenclec1 liy ' 
the defendant, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in so doing. In the recent case of King Y. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 P.2c1 
602, \Ve had occasion to determine the breadth of 
a trial court's discretion in granting a new trial 
upon that ground. After reviewing numerom 
cases from California and Oklahoma, as well a:: 
former decisions of this Court, in which trial 
courts had granted new trials upon the aforemen-
tioned ground, we held that \Yhcre there appears 
in the record competent evidence which would 
support a verdict in favor of the party moving for 
a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion 011 th~ 
part of the trial court in granting a new trial 
upon that ground.'' 
\Vhere conflict of evidence arises, this court has rl'-
pea tcdly held that it will not review the discretion exer-
cised by the trial court in granting a new trial. fTJJfO!l' 11 
Appliance a111l Radio Co. Y. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 
P.2rl 82G (1932); Williams v. O.r;den U11io11 Ry. and !Jc1iul 
Co., 110 Utal1 520, 230 P.2d :113 (1%1); King v. [T11iu11 
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f!ac. R. Co., supra (1949); Utah State Nat. Barnk v. Liv-
ingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 Pac. 781 (1927); Davis v. Utah 
Houthern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2 Pac. 521 (1883). The 
rnle is well stated in King v. Urvion Pac. R. Co., supra 
(1949) at 695: 
"In one of its earliest cases this court an-
nounced that where the testimony is conflicting, 
the granting or refusing of a new trial rests pe-
culiarly within the discretion of the trial court. 
Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126. A short time later 
in Davis v. Utah Southern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2 
P.521, we similarly stated that where there is a 
substantial conflict of evidence on a material is-
sue, we will not review the discretion exercised by 
the trial court in granting a new trial. Again in 
Utah State Nat. Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 
254 P.281, this court applied the same rule and 
upheld a trial court which had granted a new trial 
where the evidence was conflicting upon an essen-
tial issue of the case. Thompson v. Brown Live 
Stock Co., 7 4 Utah 1, 276 P. 651, accord." 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ER-
ROR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS 
A NEW TRIAL AT THE END OF THE SEC-
OND TRIAL OF THIS MATTER. 
Appellants take the position that simply because one 
juror stated upon polling that he had not yet made up 
Iii:,; mind that there was improper deliberation. 
Rule 47(q), URCP provides that a verdict is reached 
when three-fourths of the jury have agreed upon aver-
iliet. Such was the case here and it cannot be denied. 
9 
The Wyoming case of Glover v. Berger set forth by 
appellants is a nonsequitor as far as reaching this point 
is concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions reached by trial court at the first 
trial and the retrial were proper and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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